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BANK CAPITAL AND BANK STOCK PERFORMANCE AROUND 
FINANCIAL SUBPRIME CRISIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This empirical study observes the relationship between bank capital and stock 
performance when an unexpected negative shock materializes to bank value. The 
analysis covers the three months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 15
th
 
September 2008, using the holding period stock return as the dependent variable. With 
data from the US largest commercial banking and saving and loans institutions, we 
constructed a multiple regression model and performed several estimations using 
different definitions of bank capital. Our conclusions are consistent with the premise 
that better capitalized banks are in a better position to withstand the negative impacts of 
a disruptive financial event, such as the Lehman collapse, and therefore are susceptible 
to smaller stock price declines. We also find evidence that simpler and more 
conservative capital ratios are perceived by equity market participants as more accurate 
measures of bank health relative to regulatory risk based ratios. Therefore, our results 
provide support to the inclusion of simpler capital ratios that rely on balance sheet 
information to bank regulatory frameworks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Extensive literature addressing the implications of capital requirements in banks’ 
risk-taking incentives and performance usually perceives capital requirements as an 
effective tool to restrain moral hazard created by deposit insurance
1
, due to the 
complexity of computing a risk-weighted insurance premium (Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1992). The premise is that forcing banks to fund their assets with a larger equity 
stake should restrain their incentives for excessive risk-taking (see for instance Keeley 
and Furlong, 1989; Furlong and Keeley, 1990)
2
 and reduce their vulnerability to market 
disruptions by increasing their capacity to absorb unexpected losses with their own 
resources. In the context of the huge losses incurred by banks during the US subprime 
lending crisis, our paper tries to make a contribution in understanding this relation. We 
search for evidence that better capitalized banks are in a superior position to withstand  
unanticipated blows to bank value that materialize during a financial crisis, such as the 
subprime lending crisis, by observing the relationship between pre-crisis capital levels 
and the stock performance during a crisis period.  
One additional issue that we investigate is the quality of capital held by banks. 
The “procyclicality” of the Basel II risk-weighted, where fluctuations are amplified by 
business cycles
3
, means Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital may be heavily deteriorated during a 
crisis period and, therefore, we are interested in understanding whether equity markets 
better judged simpler and more conservative ratios that focus on balance sheet 
information, as common equity is the component of capital available to absorb bank 
losses. 
                                                          
1
 See Merton (1977). 
2
 See also Santos (1999) and Rochet (1992) 
3
 See for instance Kee Young Park, 2012. 
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Our analysis focus on stock returns from the largest listed US commercial banks 
and savings and loans institutions during the three months following the Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. collapse on the 15
th
 September 2008. We investigate the 
relationship between different measures of bank capital and stock performance in the 
cross section to understand whether bank capital levels prior to the shock had any 
influence in banks stock performance after the shock. We control for a series of bank 
specific variables that account for bank business model, sources of fund, liquidity, asset 
quality, size and standard asset pricing factors.  
Our baseline model is inspired by the empirical study of Kunt, Detragiache and 
Merrouche (2010) in estimating the relationship between bank capital levels and stock 
performance in the cross section. We investigate this relation for the full sample and for 
three subsamples separated by bank size. Our measures of bank capital include risk-
weighted ratios – Basel Capital Adequacy Ratio, Tier 1 Ratio and Tier 2 Ratio – and 
balance sheet ratios – Tangible Common Equity Ratio, Leverage Ratio and, as 
suggested by Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000), one bank capital measure that 
accounts for both on and off-balance sheet activities. We find evidence for our full 
sample to support that better capitalized banks suffered a smaller deterioration of their 
stock price during the period but only balance sheet ratios were significant in explaining 
stock performance. To account for the discrepancies between banks with different size, 
we define total assets thresholds similar to the ones used in the empirical work of 
Berger and Bowman (2009) and also conduct our analysis for three separate subsamples 
according to banks’ total assets. Across the large banks subsample, our conclusions 
report that banks with higher risk-weighted ratios are in a better position to absorb the 
unexpected shocks from a financial disruptive event but still balance sheet ratios are, in 
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general, perceived by equity markets as a better measure of resilience and financial 
health. Finally, we find no significant relationship between bank capital and stock 
performance during the sample period across the mid and small banks subsample. The 
rest of the paper is structured as follows: section two provides a brief literature review; 
section three provides a description on the data and methodologies used; section four 
discusses the empirical results; section five delivers a conclusive statement.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
To formulate our hypotheses, we delve on theoretical literature related to deposit 
insurance and the roles of bank capital regulation.  
Deposit insurance schemes are offered by governments to insure depositors and 
insulate banks from runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). However, by modelling deposit 
insurance as a put option on the value of the bank’s assets with an exercise price equal 
to the promised maturity of its debt commitments, Merton (1977) showed that banks 
seeking to maximize the value of their equity will maximize the value of the put by 
either shifting to riskier investments or by increasing leverage, creating a moral hazard 
issue. Due to the impossibility of determining risk-sensitive insurance premium and 
thus charge banks a fair premium for their granted protection (Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1992), capital regulation is viewed as one of the most crucial tools in dealing 
with moral hazard. Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) showed 
that publicly listed banks seeking to maximize their equity value will reduce the risk 
profile of their investments as a result of higher bank capital requirements because 
lower leverage levels are associated with a lower marginal value of the deposit 
insurance put option with respect to asset risk, assuming a fixed rate insurance 
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premium. Additionally, Santos (1999) addressed the principal-agent problem between 
banks and borrowing firms and claimed that, due to limited liability, banks have an 
incentive to change their contracts’ lending terms to induce borrowers to take on more 
risk, a problem that can be solved by increasing the bankruptcy costs of a bank through 
higher capital requirements. Still, these previous theories are challenged by a different 
set of literature that claims there is room for a positive relationship between capital 
standards and risk. Koehn and Santomero (1980) modelled banks as portfolio managers 
who maximize their risk-return combination in the efficiency frontier, in which case 
introducing a flat capital requirement might create a situation in which the bank 
reconfigures its investments to riskier assets to offset the loss of expected return by 
being forced to operate with lower leverage. Kim and Santomero (1988) showed that 
this issue may be addressed by capital requirements that are risk-based. In addition, 
Calem and Rob (1999) used a dynamic model to prove that the relationship between 
higher capital requirements and risk taking changes with the level of bank capitalization 
– low capitalized and highly capitalized banks increase risk to take advantage of deposit 
insurance and low probability of insolvency, respectively, as a result of an increase in 
capital requirements. 
These two opposing views provide sufficient motivation for empirical research to 
be conducted regarding the relationship between stock performance and bank capital. 
Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) explore whether higher bank capital levels 
was associated with better stock performance during the US recent financial crisis (Q3. 
2007 – Q1. 2009). The authors use a multi-country panel of banks and provide evidence 
that, during the crisis, better capitalized banks experienced smaller decline in their 
equity value, particularly for larger banks. The authors also conclude that stock returns 
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were more sensitive to a leverage ratio (Tier 1 to total assets) rather than to risk-
weighted ratios. Similarly, Berger and Bowman (2009) look into the relationship 
between bank capital and bank performance around normal and crisis periods and found 
a meaningful positive relationship between bank capital and stock performance during 
crisis periods only for the credit crunch of the early nineties (Q1. 1990 – Q4. 1992) but 
not for the subprime lending crisis. Still, the authors do not distinguish between 
different measures of bank capital. Our research is also motivated by one last empirical 
project. Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000) explore how bank capital level faired in 
predicting bank failures, covering US bank failures from 1989 to 1993. According to the 
authors, a good measure of capital adequacy should be very closely related to bank 
failure and, therefore, they observe and compare the informative power of different 
measures of bank capital about subsequent failures. They look into banks’ Tier I to total 
assets ratio (leverage ratio), Tier I risk-weighted capital ratio and Tier I to gross revenue 
ratio. The authors find evidence that, over longer term horizons, the risk weighted ratio 
is the most effective predictor of bank failure but, over one and two year horizons, the 
three capital measures have similar predictive power concerning bank failures. In line 
with their conclusions, the authors argue that, over short term horizons, the leverage 
ratio and gross revenue ratio can play an important role in bank regulation as they are 
simpler and virtually costless to calculate, while the regulatory burden carried in with 
risk weighted capital ratios is not offset by a higher explanatory power.  
 
METHODOLOGY – BASELINE MODEL 
The methodology used to assess our main goal is a slightly altered approach of the 
procedure used by Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) in establishing an empirical 
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relation between bank capital and bank stock performance. In particular, the core of this 
paper focuses solely on the three month holding period stock return of publicly listed 
US banking institutions after an unexpected shock to bank value materialized, such as 
the Lehman Brothers’ failure, disregarding the need to account for country and time 
specific variables. Our focus is to determine whether better capitalized banks were able 
to better resist the unexpected losses that materialized with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers by witnessing a smaller decline in their stock price than that of poorer 
capitalized banks.  We perform several estimations using the regression model below. 
                       ∑           
 
   
                                   
The model is estimated through robust least squares (RLS) to account for 
conditional heteroskedasticity inherent to equity prices (French, Schwert and 
Stambaugh, 1987) and explanatory variables are lagged nine months to ensure that 
information on each bank is incorporated in its stock price (Fama and French, 1992).  
   is the dependent variable and accounts for the three month holding period
4
 
stock return of each bank comprised in our sample following the Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse. C              stands for the pre-crisis bank capital and represents our key 
explanatory variable. In addressing the impact of pre shock bank capital levels on the 
after-shock stock returns, we want to understand which form of capital was more 
relevant to stock performance. For that purpose, we perform separate estimations of 
equation (1) for several different measures of bank capital in order to avoid collinearity 
problems between our key predictors. Our first measure of bank capital is the capital 
adequacy ratio as defined by the Basel II regulatory framework
5
. We also examine each 
                                                          
4
 From 16/09/2008 to 16/12/2008 
5
 See “The new Basel Capital Accord: An explanatory Note”, Bank for International Settlements, 2001. 
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constituent of the latter ratio separately – Tier I ratio (composed of common and 
preferred stock and disclosed reserves) and Tier II ratio (lower quality capital mostly 
composed of subordinated debt) – to account for the quality of its capital instruments. In 
addition, we include more conservative approaches to bank capital measured by the 
tangible common equity (TCE) ratio, which is obtained by dividing each bank’s 
tangible common equity by its tangible assets
6
, and by the leverage ratio, obtainable by 
dividing tier 1 capital by total assets. Our goal is to understand whether equity markets 
incorporate in their expectations the “procyclicality” of risk-weighted ratios (Ki Young 
Park, 2012) and perceive better quality capital as a more accurate measure of bank 
health and resilience, as tier 1 capital and, in particular, common equity, are the 
components of capital available for banks to absorb unexpected losses. Finally, we 
include a proxy for the gross revenue ratio used by Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000) 
in predicting bank failures, which we will from now on refer to as E Ratio. The authors 
obtain their ratio by dividing Tier 1 by gross revenue. Our departure from the literature 
consists on dividing Tier I capital by total balance and off balance sheet assets instead. 
We want to account for the increasing tendency of banks engagement in off-balance 
sheet activities as part of the financial innovation and securitization hype and so, 
consistent with the authors view, we consider this ratio to be a better risk assessment of 
a bank’s uses of funds. In line with this view, we want to observe how equity market 
participants perceive this capital measure. 
To isolate the explanatory power of bank capital in our cross sectional analysis we 
include in our model a set of bank specific explanatory variables. The variable 
         in equation (1) stands for such bank specific variables that account for bank 
                                                          
6
 Tangible common equity was obtained by subtracting intangible assets and preferred equity from 
common equity and tangible assets was obtained by subtracting intangible assets from total assets. 
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business model, sources of funding, asset quality, liquidity, size, profitability, value and 
correlation with the market. A more detailed section explaining these variables is 
provided further on this section. We test for the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for bank specific variables, it is expected that the stock 
price of better capitalized banks does not fall as much as that of poorly capitalized 
banks.  
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for bank specific variables, it is expected that simpler 
and more conservative capital ratios that rely on balance sheet information have a 
higher positive impact on stock performance than regulatory risk-weighted capital 
ratios. 
Over the course of our regressions we also grouped our sample into three different 
categories according to bank size measured by total assets. In doing so, our aim is to 
alleviate the bank size bias as moral hazard tends to play differently amongst different 
sized banks. More information regarding this approach is provided in the paragraph 
below. We followed a division similar to the one performed by Berger and Bowman 
(2009) and defined large banks with assets exceeding US$ 4 billion, medium banks with 
assets exceeding US$ 1.5 billion and up to US$ 4 billion and small banks with assets up 
to US$ 1.5 billion. 
As previously mentioned, we controlled for bank specific variables that were 
considered to be relevant in assessing bank stock performance during our analysis 
period.  Controlling for size, we accounted for each bank’s total assets
7
. We relied on 
some existing theory on banking that suggests banks’ diversification and size to be 
positively correlated (Diamond, 1984) and that points out to the fact that larger banks 
                                                          
7
 Variable included in regression model as log (total assets) 
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have historically used their diversification benefits to operate with higher leverage 
levels (Liang and Rhoades, 1991) and invest in riskier assets (Demsetz and Strahan, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997)
 8
. We expect that larger banks are better 
able to take advantage of “regulatory arbitrage” opportunities, enabling them to find 
ways to hide risk and give their balance sheet the appearance of stability – for instance, 
through securitizations – in which case they are more vulnerable to unexpected negative 
shocks (Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche, 2010). Controlling for banks’ business 
models, we looked into banks total loans (net of unearned income) to total assets ratio. 
We find this an accurate approach to capture the extent of bank exposure to credit risk 
and potential liquidity shortages and thus expect a negative impact by this ratio on the 
stock performance of banks. As a complement, we also look into the quality of banks’ 
loan portfolios by including in our model the provisions set aside by banks to cover loan 
losses as a percentage of total assets. According to Thakor (1987), a change in the 
provision for loan losses might be a reflection on the future health of a bank’s loan 
portfolio. Also Madura and Zarruk (1992) observed that an increase in banks’ 
provisions for loan losses related to bad real estate loans is translated in negative stock 
performance. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between bank stock performance 
and this variable. Controlling for banks’ sources of funds, we assessed their reliance on 
deposit funding, by dividing each bank’s total deposits by total assets. Due to the 
disruption in the wholesale funding market during the crisis, we consider that banks 
funded with a higher portion of deposits were perceived to be in a more stable position, 
which would be reflected by a better stock performance. In addition, we controlled for 
liquidity by including a ratio that divided total cash due from banks by total assets. Cash 
                                                          
8
 See also Stiroh (2004), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Berger and Mester (1997), who argue that 
larger banks tend to engage in riskier investments and depend less on deposit funding and more on 
wholesale funding due to their lower funding costs 
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due from banks includes cash on hand, cash items in the process of collection and non-
interest deposits with banks. A higher ratio suggests that a bank is in a better position to 
manage unexpected cash needs and so we expect a positive relationship with stock 
performance. Finally, we included in our set of control variables the price to book ratio, 
return on equity and correlation with the market, in order to account for the factors used 
in standard asset pricing models (Fama and French, 1992, The Journal of Finance).  
 
DATA 
In order to construct explanatory variables at the individual bank level for our 
baseline model, we combine accounting data from COMPUSTAT with data from 
Bloomberg. Our sample includes all US listed commercial banks and savings and loans 
institutions (federally and non-federally chartered), with Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) 6020, 6035 and 6036, respectively. The following bank capital 
variables and control variables, with their respective COMPUSTAT codes, are obtained 
for December 2007: total assets (AT), risk adjusted tier 1 capital ratio (CAPR1), risk 
adjusted tier 2 capital ratio (CAPR2), risk adjusted capital ratio (CAPR3), cash and due 
from banks (CDBT), common equity (CEQ), tangible common equity (CEQT), total 
deposits (DPTC), goodwill (GDWL), intangible assets (INTAN), total investment 
securities (IST), loans net of unearned income (LG), non-redeemable preferred stock 
(PSTKN) and preferred stock liquidation value (PSTKL).  
We use Bloomberg to obtain stock prices for the banks in our sample and to fill in 
missing balance sheet information unavailable in COMPUSTAT, namely price-to-book 
ratios (PX_TO_BOOK_RATIO), return on common equity (RETURN_COM_EQY) 
and market betas (APPLIED_BETA). Regarding the baseline model, we obtain stock 
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prices for the 16
th
 of September 2008 and for the 16
th
 of December 2008 and compute 
the holding period return. Our sample is comprised of 320 US listed commercial banks 
and savings and loans institutions, separated into 98 large banks, 104 medium banks and 
118 small banks. 
Summary Statistics 
Table A provides a descriptive analysis for the sample period of the variables 
included in our baseline model. Regarding bank capital levels, the median for the full 
sample capital adequacy ratio is 11.65%, which is in compliance with the minimum 
capital requirement of 10% recommended by the Basell II guidelines. The ratio remains 
relatively stable when we divide the full sample according to bank size. For the full 
sample Tier I and Tier II capital ratios, their respective medians stand at 10.00% and 
1.26%. The subsample of larger banks seems to rely less on Tier I capital (9.32%) and 
more on lower quality instruments of capital (Tier II of 2.43%) relative to the mid (Tier 
I – 9.96%; Tier II – 1.25%) and small subsamples (Tier I – 10.44%; Tier II – 1.20%).  
The full sample median for the TCE ratio is 7.03% and the leverage ratio is 
9.20%. Larger banks have a slightly higher median for the leverage ratio (9.53%) and 
lower median for the TCE ratio (6.14%). Finally, the full sample median for the E ratio 
is 7.92% and is somewhat similar across all subsamples (7.87%, 7.92% and 8.00% for 
the large, mid and small subsamples, respectively). In conclusion, there is some 
evidence to support that larger banks operate with higher leverage levels
9
 and lower 
quality of capital. Their median holding period return holding period stock return (HPR) 
is approximately minus 24.57%, while the median for the mid and small subsample is 
                                                          
9
 See Liang and Rhoades, 1991  and Demsetz and Strahan, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997 
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minus 20.69% and minus 23.39%. For the full sample, the median holding period stock 
return is -23.29%. 
In terms of our bank specific control variables, we observe that small banks are 
less exposed to market fluctuations, as measured by their market beta (0.51), which 
might suggest that small banks were less exposed to economy-wide systemic risk and 
better buffered to navigate through the financial crisis. Regarding banks’ sources of 
funds, banks within the large group tend to rely less on deposit funding (0.68) than 
banks within the mid and small group. In terms of banks’ business models, we observe 
that banks within the large group have a lower proportion of loans on their overall asset 
base. Finally, we also observe that banks within the large group set aside larger 
provisions for loan losses as a percentage of total assets, which might indicate that 
larger banks engaged in riskier activities in the past.  
 
BASELINE MODEL RESULTS 
The model uses bank capital, balance sheet information and standard asset pricing 
factors as explanatory variables, lagged nine months from the dependent variable, to 
predict the stock performance of listed US retail banking institutions for the three 
months following the Lehman Brothers’ collapse on the 15
th
 September 2008. We 
present estimation results across tables B.  
Our results regarding the relationship between bank capital and stock performance 
are consistent with the empirical conclusions of Kunt, Merrouche and Detragiache 
(2010) and confirm our first hypothesis that higher capitalized banks suffer lower 
declines on their stock price after an unexpected disruptive event takes place. In 
addition, we found supporting evidence to the results of Estrella, Park and Peristiani 
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(2000) in the sense that the regulatory burden of risk weighted capital ratios does not 
translate into higher power in explaining bank performance over short term horizons.  
For the full sample, the risk weighted capital ratios, as defined by Basel regulatory 
framework, are positive but not significant, even after splitting capital into Tier 1 and 
Tier 2. The latter result changes for the subset comprising large banks. The capital 
adequacy ratio is positive and significant at the 5% level, rewarding stock performance 
during the crisis period with a stock return increase of 133 basis points per each 
additional percentage point increase in the pre-crisis ratio. Splitting between Tier I and 
Tier II, the ratios remain (marginally) significant but with opposing signs. This confirms 
that when assessing the capital adequacy ratio, investors are more focused on higher 
quality capital instruments, which is reflected by the Tier 1 positive coefficient (1.7). 
On the contrary, increasing the proportion of pre-crisis Tier 2 capital by one percentage 
point is expected to deteriorate stock performance during the crisis period by 
approximately 215 basis points. One possible explanation for such preference is that, 
since Tier II capital is mostly comprised of subordinated debt instruments, it is easier to 
cut dividends than to default on interest payments when additional cash is needed, 
providing equity instruments a higher mobility to deal with unexpected market 
fluctuations. The Basel capital ratios are not significant in the subsets comprising mid 
and small size banks. 
Turning to the leverage ratio, our estimation for the full sample dictates that an 
increase in its pre-crisis level by one percentage point is translated into an increased 
stock return during a crisis period by 124 basis points. This result is significant for a 
99% confidence level. On our subset of large banks, the leverage ratio remains 
significant at the 1% level and has an even higher magnitude, with stock return 
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estimated to increase by 186 basis points per each percentage point increase in the ratio. 
The leverage ratio is not significant in the subsets comprising mid and small size banks.  
Regarding the tangible common equity ratio, our result for the full sample 
estimates stock return to increase roughly by 70 basis points during a crisis period with 
each additional percentage point increase in this pre-crisis ratio. This result is only 
marginally significant. Still, for the subset of large banks, the magnitude of the 
coefficient associated to the TCE ratio is higher (1,347) and significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, regarding the E ratio, we find that it had the highest, significant impact on stock 
performance during the crisis (1.345) for the full sample. This suggests that equity 
markets also placed high value on information regarding off-balance sheet activities, 
particularly because during the years that preceded the bust financial firms oversaw the 
securitization of real estate mortgages along with many types of consumers loans into 
asset backed securities, many of which were “bad loans”. This ratio remains significant 
at 5% for the subset comprising the large banks and is still a strong predictor of stock 
performance during the crisis (1.347). Both the leverage ratio and the gross revenue 
ratio are not significant across the mid and small subsets of banks. 
10
 
Turning to bank controls, our results seem consistent with our initial expectations. 
Our full sample results show that banks with a higher proportion of their funds invested 
in loans were worse perceived by equity markets, which is a clear reflection of the 
increasing exposure of banks’ loan portfolios to subprime borrowers over the years that 
preceded the financial crisis. In this sense, the Lehman Brothers’ collapse was an 
important catalyst of the crisis as it enhanced the lack of confidence in banks’ portfolios 
and enhanced the problem of asymmetry of information between banks and 
                                                          
10
 Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) provide an explanation based on the Caleb-Rob model for 
the reason capital only affects stock returns among large banks. 
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investors/borrowers. Interestingly, these results hold but are only significant for the 
subsets of mid and small size banks, which might reflect the bailout expectations held 
by investors for large banks but not so much for mid and small ones. We also find 
evidence regarding this issue by observing that, for the full sample, banks with higher 
provisions set aside as allowances for “bad loans” suffered a higher negative impact on 
their stock price during the months following the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Again, 
this result holds but is significant only for the mid and small subsets of banks. Our 
discussion regarding banks’ business model and asset quality is consistent with Cavallo 
and Majnoni (2002), who found that banks with higher loan to asset ratios are usually 
more exposed to credit risk and thus their provisions for loan losses are higher. 
Bank size was also captured by equity markets as an important sign of financial 
health. Our full sample estimation suggests that investors perceived larger banks to be 
more prone to the subprime and securitization machine and, therefore, much more 
exposed to credit risk. As securitization became commonplace during the years that 
preceded the crisis, banks shifted to aggressive growth policies that involved credit 
expansion at the expense of pervasive managerial practices, which might provide an 
explanation to the negative coefficient associated with the size control variable. 
In terms of liquidity, our cash position indicator seems to be quite a significant 
predictor of bank performance but only for the mid and small subsets, with its 
predicting power much stronger in the mid group.  
Finally, the only variable viewed positively by investors relates to bank 
profitability, with bank return on equity having a positive and significant coefficient 
sign for the full sample. This result is significant at 1% level and only holds significant 
for the subset of large banks.  
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The coefficients of the control variables previously discussed have minimal 
variations across each regression for different measures of bank capital and their 
significance remains unchanged. All of the remaining lagged control variables were not 
significant in explaining bank stock performance during the crisis period. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our empirical analysis provides some insight to the relationship between bank 
capital requirements and equity value. We investigate the 320 largest US listed retail 
banking institutions and study the impact of bank capital on each bank’s stock 
performance during the three months that followed the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. The 
goals of our study are to understand whether higher bank capital provided banks with a 
superior capacity to withstand the unexpected shock that materialized to bank value and, 
if so, whether better quality capital instruments were better perceived by equity markets. 
Our results are strongly consistent with the empirical study of Kunt, Detragiache 
and Merrouche (2010) and support the hypothesis that better capitalized banks are in a 
superior position to withstand the negative shocks that materialize to bank value during 
financial crisis. We find that risk-weighted capital ratios were only significant predictors 
of stock performance for large banks but did not outperform cruder bank capital 
measures, as stock returns were more sensitive to the TCE ratio, the leverage ratio and 
the E ratio. We find that capital ratios do not help explaining stock returns for the small 
and mid-size sample of banks.  
In terms of policy implications, our results support the argument put forth by 
Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000) that risk-weighted capital ratios do not outperform 
cruder balance sheet capital ratios in explaining stock price variations over short term 
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horizons. We also provide evidence related to how negatively equity markets perceived 
low quality capital (Tier 2) as defined by the Basel framework, which suggests the need 
for the revision of the type of instruments eligible for regulatory capital to include 
simpler ratios that are easier to implement and to increase the quality of capital that is 
used to absorb unexpected losses. This paper provides some motivation for future 
research regarding this theme, for instance, by applying a similar empirical analysis on 
banks that operate within different regions of the world to infer whether the Basel 
framework works similarly across the globe.   
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APPENDIX 
Table A: Descriptive Statistics 
Table A provides a statistical description of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Information regarding capital ratios and balance sheet variables is obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT database for December 2007, while information regarding market based 
variables (P/B ratio, Beta and RoE) is obtained from Bloomberg for December 2007. 
Information regarding stock prices is obtained from Bloomberg for the 16
th
 September 2008 and 
16
th
 December 2008 and the holding period stock return is obtained for each bank. We use the 
median over the mean, as the latter is not a robust measure of the central tendency due to the 
existence of very outliers. 
 
 Sample Full  Large  Mid  Small  
# Observations 320 98 104 118 
Holding period return -23.29% -24.57% -20.69% -23.39% 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 11.65% 11.70% 11.51% 11.87% 
Tier 1 Ratio 10.00% 9.32% 9.96% 10.44% 
Tier 2 Ratio 1.26% 2.43% 1.25% 1.20% 
Leverage Ratio 9.20% 9.53% 9.02% 9.07% 
E Ratio 7.92% 7.87% 7.92% 8.00% 
Tangible Equity Ratio 7.03% 6.14% 6.80% 7.97% 
Loans to assets 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.76 
Deposits to assets 0.73 0.68 0.75 0.75 
LLP to assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cash position indicator 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total assets (US millions) 2197 11097 2407 1008 
Market beta 0.95 1.06 1.07 0.51 
Return on equity (%) 10.14 11.23 9.60 10.04 
Price to book ratio 1.49 1.50 1.53 1.46 
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Table B: Baseline model – Regression results- Full Sample 
 
Table B displays the baseline regression results for the entire sample. Results are obtained from 
robust least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the holding period return during the 
three months following the Lehman Brothers failure (from 16
th
 September 2008 to the 16
th
 
December 2008). Six different estimations of the model are computed for each bank capital 
measure. The values in parenthesis represent the p-values. The sample is composed of 320 
banks and the adjusted r-squared is presented on the bottom of the table.  
 
FULL SAMPLE CAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Leverage TCE E Ratio 
Constant 0.139 0.133 0.265 0.107 0.153 0.204 
  [0.4884] [0.513] [0.133] [0.538] [0.396] [0.224] 
Bank Capital Ratio 0.415 0.599 0.208 1.244 0.696 1.345 
  [0.231] [0.223] [0.693] [0.001] [0.079] [0.001] 
Loans to assets -0.299 -0.286 -0.331 -0.342 -0.345 -0.42 
  [0.011] [0.012] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Deposits to assets -0.094 -0.13 -0.119 -0.086 -0.077 -0.097 
  [0.5347] [0.383] [0.44] [0.56] [0.607] [0.507] 
LLP to assets -13.054 -12.961 -13.35 -11.268 -12.793 -11.421 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cash to assets -0.167 -0.194 -0.126 -0.431 .0.287 -0.517 
  [0.737] [0.697] [0.801] [0.382] [0.563] [0.299] 
Log(size) -0.082 -0.075 -0.091 -0.089 -0.076 -0.095 
  [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] 
Market beta 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.044 0.054 0.049 
  [0.1946] [0.2861] [0.197] [0.261] [0.173] [0.214] 
Return on equity 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
  [0.004] [0.0063] [0.007] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
P/B Ratio 0.034 0.038 0.036 0.046 0.029 0.043 
  [0.262] [0.201] [0.229] [0.121] [0.332] [0.146] 
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Adjusted R Squared 0.168 0.169 0.166 0.188 0.171 0.18 
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Table B1: Baseline model – Regression results- Large Sample 
Table B1 exhibits the baseline regression results for the larger subsample of banks (total assets 
larger than US$ 4 billion). The subsample is comprised of 98 banks and the adjusted r-squared 
is presented in the bottom of the table. 
 
LARGE SAMPLE CAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Leverage TCE E Ratio 
Constant 0.33 0.49 1.085 0.449 0.637 0.703 
  [0.413] [0.253] [0.016] [0.276] [0.107] [0.079] 
Bank Capital 1.33 1.7 -2.149 1.861 1.347 1.833 
  [0.03] [0.081] [0.06] [0.002] [0.039] [0.003] 
Loans to assets -0.11 -0.052 -0.094 -0.194 -0.223 -0.297 
  [0.541] [0.787] [0.661] [0.296] [0.223] [0.118] 
Deposits to assets -0.221 -0.424 -0.591 -0.383 -0.361 -0.42 
  [0.369] [0.099] [0.054] [0.125] [0.145] [0.094] 
LLP to assets -5.706 -5.978 -9.722 0.156 -5.056 -0.002 
  [0.354] [0.349] [0.179] [0.981] [0.420] [0.999] 
Cash to assets -0.259 -0.171 -0.134 -0.439 -0.304 -0.475 
  [0.639] [0.766] [0.835] [0.442] [0.590] [0.42] 
Log(size) -0.131 -0.124 -0.132 -0.15 -0.141 -0.169 
  [0.002] [0.008] [0.009] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Market beta -0.013 -0.094 -0.315 -0.016 -0.032 -0.047 
  [0.912] [0.457] [0.026] [0.899] [0.798] [0.718] 
Return on equity 0.018 0.017 0.008 0.018 0.018 0.019 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.167] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
P/B Ratio -0.073 -0.07 0.007 -0.02 -0.072 -0.037 
  [0.185] [0.224] [0.917] [0.729] [0.198] [0.511] 
N 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Adjusted R Squared 0.066 0.067 0.104 0.131 0.082 0.127 
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Table B2: Baseline model – Regression results- Mid Sample 
Table B2 exhibits the baseline regression results for the mid subsample of banks (total assets in 
between US$ 1.5 billion and US$ 4 billion). The subsample is comprised of 104 banks and the 
adjusted r-squared is presented in the bottom of the table. 
 
MID SAMPLE CAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Leverage TCE E Ratio 
Constant 0.017 0.012 -0.08 -0.153 -0.252 -0.136 
  [0.979] [0.985] [0.895] [0.8034] [0.263] [0.824] 
Bank Capital -0.644 -0.689 0.247 0.588 -0.338 0.689 
  [0.51] [0.449] [0.862] [0.491] [0.727] [0.462] 
Loans to assets -0.405 -0.393 -0.36 -0.371 -0.352 -0.4 
  [0.036] [0.034] [0.057] [0.049] [0.062] [0.045] 
Deposits to assets 0.046 0.092 0.096 0.087 0.061 0.081 
  [0.868] [0.734] [0.737] [0.752] [0.825] [0.767] 
LLP to assets -31.54 -32.78 -30.68 -29.861 -31.251 [-29.91] 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cash to assets 3.574 3.826 3.484 3.164 3.381 3.119 
  [0.029] [0.022] [0.036] [0.057] [0.037] [0.062] 
Log(size) -0.053 -0.07 -0.07 -0.057 -0.06 -0.055 
  [0.764] [0.698] [0.7023] [0.752] [0.743] [0.759] 
Market beta 0.127 0.147 0.13 0.107 0.118 0.109 
  [0.1375] [0.097] [0.153] [0.221] [0.135] [0.212] 
Return on equity 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
  [0.258] [0.254] [0.231] [0.189] [0.245] [0.183] 
P/B Ratio 0.055 0.048 0.05 0.063 0.054 0.063 
  [0.271] [0.334] [0.326] [0.222] [0.287] [0.221] 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Adjusted R Squared 0.325 0.325 0.323 0.326 0.33 0.326 
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Table B3: Baseline model – Regression results- Small Sample 
Table B3 exhibits the baseline regression results for the small subsample of banks (total assets 
below US$ 1.5 billion). The subsample is comprised of 118 banks and the adjusted r-squared is 
presented in the bottom of the table. 
 
 
 
SMALL SAMPLE CAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Leverage TCE E Ratio 
Constant 0.097 0.101 0.221 0.117 0.142 0.191 
  [0.897] [0.895] [0.758] [0.871] [0.845] [0.789] 
Bank Capital 0.348 0.495 0.479 0.62 0.406 0.663 
  [0.474] [0.517] [0.521] [0.326] [0.509] [0.378] 
Loans to assets -0.32 -0.313 -0.367 -0.377 -0.375 -0.435 
  [0.126] [0.138] [0.053] [0.038] [0.04] [0.021] 
Deposits to assets -0.204 -0.233 -0.205 -0.186 -0.197 -0.193 
  [0.422] [0.354] [0.421] [0.467] [0.445] [0.446] 
LLP to assets -8.898 -8.937 -9.101 -8.405 -8.739 -8.531 
  [0.029] [0.029] [0.025] [0.041] [0.033] [0.039] 
Cash to assets 3.817 3.893 3.748 3.52 3.688 3.477 
  [0.012] [0.011] [0.017] [0.021] [0.015] [0.025] 
Log(size) -0.05 -0.049 -0.068 -0.051 -0.047 -0.057 
  [0.822] [0.827] [0.758] [0.816] [0.831] [0.794] 
Market beta 0.023 0.021 0.03 0.008 0.016 0.01 
  [0.81] [0.827] [0.742] [0.933] [0.869] [0.914] 
Return on equity 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.485 
  [0.285] [0.34] [0.271] [0.243] [0.273] [0.253] 
P/B Ratio 0.03 0.032 0.029 0.035 0.03 0.035 
  [0.596] [0.571] [0.607] [0.534] [0.595] [0.536] 
N 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Adjusted R Squared 0.134 0.133 0.133 0.138 0.135 0.14 
 
